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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses a case study approach to analyze how three corporations; namely, Hutchison 
Whampoa Limited (HWL), Hutchison Telecommunication International Limited (HTIL), and 
Hutchison Telecommunication Hong Kong Holdings, managed earnings through 
consolidation. The author finds that HWL, by listing, reducing, and increasing its 
shareholding in HTIL, improved its levels of profitability during the study period of 2004–
2010. Furthermore, HTIL spun off its Hong Kong and Macau businesses to improve its 
profitability directly and that of HWL indirectly. Finally, HWL privatized HTIL in 2010. The 
author demonstrates that although HTIL was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, HTIL 
and HWL improved their share performances by managing earnings through consolidation 
techniques. 
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INTRODUCTION OF CASE COMPANIES 
 
Background of Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL) 
 
WL is a listed corporation in Hong Kong (stock code: 0013) that is considered to be one of 
the most technologically advanced and marketing-savvy telecommunications operators in 
Asia
1
. As well as providing telecommunication services under three brands across 14 
countries, it is also a leading port operator, retailer, and property and infrastructure developer. HWL is 49.97% 
owned by the Cheung Kong Group (Stock code: 0001), which is also listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(SEHK). HWL’s flagship companies include Hutchison Port Holdings, Hutchison Telecom, Hutchison 
Whampoa Properties, A.S. Watson, and Cheung Kong Infrastructure. 
 
Background of Hutchison Telecommunication International Limited (HTIL) 
 
 HTIL
2
, which was listed on the SEHK between 2003 and 2010 (stock code: 2332), was a leading 
provider of telecommunication services in the world. The company offered mobile and fixed-line 
telecommunication services in Hong Kong, Macau, India, and Israel and mobile-only telecommunication 
services in Indonesia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Before its privatization in 2010, it was the first 
provider of 3G mobile services in Hong Kong and Macau and later provided GSM services in Vietnam and Sri 
Lanka and CDMA technology services in Indonesia and Thailand. In addition to being listed on the SEHK, its 
American Depositary Shares were also traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). HTIL became a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the HWL in mid-2010
3
. 
 
                                                 
1 Information from the firm website: http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/eng/index.htm. 
2 For more information about Hutchison Telecom, see www.htil.com. 
3 Source:  Modified from HWL’s website: http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/eng/about/milestones/1960.htm#1960. 
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Background of Hutchison Telecommunication Hong Kong Holdings Limited (HTHK) 
 
 Hutchison Telecommunication Hong Kong Holdings Limited (HTHK) is a listed company in Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (Stock Code: 0215) by way of introduction. HTHK provides telecommunication services 
in Hong Kong under the brand name “3”. Its product range includes broadband, fixed-line communication, Wi-
Fi, and IDD services to carrier customers in Hong Kong and overseas
4
. In 2010, HTHK was included in the 
Hang Seng Composite Industry Index (Telecommunications) and Hang Seng Composite Small Cap Index. For 
the year ending 2008, its turnover was USD 1,044 million and profit was USD 61 million before its listing on 
the SEHK (stock code: 0215). HTIL, a wholly owned subsidiary of HWL, holds a controlling stake in HTHK. 
 
COMPANY HISTORIES 
 
History of HWL 
 
 The origins of HWL can be traced back to the 19
th
 century merger of Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock, 
founded in Hong Kong in 1863, and Hutchison International founded in 1877. In 1960, Hutchison International 
acquired a controlling stake in Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock and later formed HWL in 1977. After running 
into financial difficulties, it was rescued by HSBC, which two years later sold it to the Cheung Kong Group. 
From the 1980s onward, HWL started to penetrate into different industries, including property development, 
retail, electricity supply, hotel and tourism, financial services, supermarkets, telecommunications, natural 
resources, broadcasting, infrastructure, and transportation through joint ventures or partnerships, acquisitions, 
and self-development (see Exhibit 1 in the Appendix for more details:  HWL History 1970-2010). 
 
 As an example of its strategy to expand through acquisitions
5
, it acquired the PARKnSHOP 
supermarket chain in 1973 in order to provide a stable cash flow for HWL and its subsidiaries. In 1977, 
Hutchison International Limited merged with Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Company Limited and three 
years later, HWL created the Hutchison Whampoa Property Group. In 1985, HWL acquired a controlling stake 
in Hong Kong Electric Holdings for USD 373 million. This became the engine of growth for HWL for the next 
10 years because of the rapid economic development and resulting soaring demand for electricity in Hong Kong. 
In 1987, HWL acquired 43% of Husky Oil in Canada while in 1990, Fortress joined the A.S. Watson Group. 
HWL also acquired substantial holdings in Felixstowe, Britain's premier container port, in 1990 and took a 50% 
holding in a Shanghai container port two years later. 
 
History of HTIL 
 
 Although HTIL was originally part of HWL, in 1999, Hutchison Telecom sold Orange and reinvested 
into 3G mobile services. In 2004, HWL spun off its telecommunication business (later renamed HTIL) and 
listed it on the SEHK. However, it kept its UK and European 3G businesses within HWL because they provided 
large cash flows for investing into 3G infrastructure. Besides its operations in Hong Kong and Macau, HTIL 
globalized its telecommunication business across Asia and the Middle East, including India, Israel, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand (adopted from Exhibit 2 in the Appendix). In 2007, it sold a 67% stake of its 
Indian business to Vodafone for USD 1.7 billion
6
. Two years later, HTIL spun off HTHK and listed it on the 
SEHK (stock code: 0215) as its rate of return was too low. Spinning off and going public improved the 
profitability of HTIL (see Exhibit 3 in the Appendix and for further discussion, see the Case Analysis section). 
 
History of HTHK 
 
 HTIL was granted a license to operate mobile services under the AMPS cellular radiotelephone 
network in 1984. In 1995, it launched GSM mobile services in Hong Kong and began to provide fixed-line 
services under the brand name HGC. In 2001, Hutchison Macau started providing GSM mobile services in 
                                                 
4 Source: Modified from 2009 HTHK Annual Report P.4. 
5 Source: Modified from HWL’s website: http://www.hutchison-whampoa.com/eng/about/milestones/1960.htm#1960. 
6 From 2008 Annual report p. 35. 
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Macau, while three years later it became the first operator to launch a 3G service in Hong Kong. HTIL now 
provides mobile services under the brand name “3”. Hutchison Macau also provides 3G services in Macau (for 
more details, see the corporate structure of HTHK in Exhibit 4 in the Appendix). 
 
CASE ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction to IAS 27 Accounting for Consolidation
7
 
 
 Based on the definition provided by IAS 27, shareholders are the owners of a corporation. According to 
IAS 27, a corporation controls the composition of the board of the directors of another corporation, controls 
more than half of the voting power of another corporation, or holds more than half of the issued share capital of 
another corporation. 
 
 When one corporation (i.e., holding) acquires the control of another (i.e., subsidiary), its shareholders 
need to know the financial circumstances of not only the holding corporation, but also the group, in order to 
assess their investments. From the group’s accounts, investors are thus able to assess the liquidity and financial 
stability or gearing of the group in order to aid investment decisions. Further, the unrealized profit arising from 
inter-company transactions can also be eliminated. IAS 27 thus has two aims: 1) to prepare and present the 
consolidated financial statements as a group under the controlling corporation and 2) to ensure the correct 
accounting treatment for investments in subsidiaries, joint controlled firms, and associates. 
 
 A holding corporation is required to present consolidated financial statements for all its subsidiaries 
except in the following three circumstances: 1) the parent is itself a wholly-owned subsidiary or is a partially-
owned subsidiary of another entity and its other owners, including those not otherwise entitled to vote, have 
been informed about, and do not object to the parent not presenting consolidated financial statements (see 
HTIL’s annual report 2005); 2) when a parent corporation’s equity instruments are not traded in a public market; 
or 3) when an ultimate or intermediate parent produces the consolidated financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS. Further, consolidated financial statements must be prepared under the same accounting policies while 
non-controlling interest must be separately shown under equity. 
 
 The partial disposal of an investment in a subsidiary can be classified into two cases:  
 
1. When control is retained: Under these circumstances, the sale transaction is treated as one owner 
transferring his/her shares to another and thus no gain or loss on disposal is recognized. For example, 
HWL disposed of 29% of HTIL’s interests to the public (for more details, see the Earnings 
Management section). 
2. When control is not retained: Under these circumstances, parties need to recognize the gain or loss on 
the disposal of the shares in subsidiaries. This gain or loss is the difference between the fair value and 
carrying amount of the holding. For example, HWL sold 21% of HTIL’s interest (for more details, see 
the HTIL’s Share Performance after the Announcement of Earnings section). This is why the 
ownership, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, of more than half of the voting or potential 
voting power of an investor does not constitute control.  
 
Disclosures Required in Consolidated Financial Statements 
 
 Nature of relationship between the parent and a subsidiary when the parent does not directly or 
indirectly own more than 50% voting power of a subsidiary. 
 The reason why direct or indirect ownership through subsidiaries of more than 50% voting power of 
investee doesn’t constitute the control. 
 The reporting date of financial statements from a subsidiary and the reasons of difference when the 
date of such financial statements used by a subsidiary is different from the parent.  
                                                 
7 Modified from Deloitte IAS Plus: Summary of International Financial Reporting Standards 
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HTIL Listing in 2004 
 
 In September 2004, HWL and HTIL were working on spinning off the telecommunication business in 
Hong Kong, India, Israel, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Paraguay, Ghana, and Macau listed on the SEHK. One month 
later, HTIL’s American Depositary Shares began to be traded on the NYSE. Thereafter, based on HKAS 27, 
HTIL was required to prepare its consolidated financial statements, income statements, and cash flow statements 
for 2003 and 2004 for comparison purposes. All intra-company transactions also needed to be eliminated during 
the process of consolidation
8
 (for more details on IAS 27 and HKAS 27, please see the Introduction to IAS 27 
Accounting for Consolidation section). 
 
 HWL primarily listed HTIL in order to sell 29% of its shares to the public and thus improve 
profitability, although it still needed to consolidate HTIL’s financial reports in 2004 as it had retained 70% of 
the firm. Exhibit 5 (in the Appendix) shows that HTIL generated a low level of profit in 2004. If HWL had 
decided not to list HTIL, Hutchison would not have dripped down its profit as it would not have generated a 
gain on disposal of USD 527 million in the 2004 annual report. Thus, because it still held 100% of HTIL, return 
on sales would have decreased from 7.2% to 4.16% and shareholder profit would have decreased from USD 
2,073 million to USD 1,558 million. Therefore, HWL wanted to list HTIL in 2004 in order to increase its overall 
profit. 
 
 Whether HWL held 70% or 100% of the shares, there was no great difference in assets and liabilities 
except cash and cash equivalents, which would have increased by USD 990 million following the disposal of 
approximately 30% of HWL’s interest in HTIL (see Exhibit 6 in the Appendix). Furthermore, retained earnings 
would have also increased the gain on disposal by USD 530 million. The remaining capital and reserves of 
HTIL would then transfer to non-controlling interest. 
 
 Moreover, after the consolidation of all HTIL companies’ balance sheets and income statements, the 
return on equity, return on sales, and asset turnover of the group would have reduced by 4.72%, 4.16%, and 2.07 
times, respectively, compared with 6.18%, 7.2%, and 0.208 times with 70% of HTIL (see Exhibit 6, Part B, in 
the Appendix). These ratios reflect the fact that listing HTIL would have increased shareholder profitability. 
Thus, HWL aimed to reduce the shareholding to 70% in order to improve the group’s overall performance. 
 
 There were two other reasons behind the decision to list. First, the listing of HTIL generated an 
immediate gain of USD 0.53 billion, including sales of 4.2% to its business partner NTT DoCoMo. This profit 
was recorded in HWL’s 2004 income statement. Second, HTIL going public helped the firm reduce its future 
cost of capital in order to acquire more telecommunication businesses from overseas. On 30 September 2004, 
the CEO of HTIL announced to the press (Apple Daily) that the intention to list HTIL was not to generate more 
cash, as HWL had more than $1.55 billion in cash reserves at that time, but to acquire new funds to invest in 
telecommunication projects in East Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. 
 
HWL Reducing its Shares in HTIL in 2005 
 
 During 2005, HWL sold 19.3% of its interest in HTIL, meaning that HTIL was no longer a subsidiary 
of HWL, as it owned only 49.8% of HTIL. Based on the accounting policy regarding consolidation introduced 
in the Introduction to IAS 27 Accounting for Consolidation section, a firm only treats a corporation as a 
subsidiary when the group directly or indirectly controls more than 50% of the equity voting rights or issued 
share capital
9
. Thus, HWL did not need to consolidate with HTIL because its voting rights and issued share 
capital was less than 50% and it did not control the board of directors. Under the shareholder agreement, HWL 
                                                 
8 Refer to 2004 Annual Report P.86 – 87. 
9 Please refer to HWL 2005 annual report p. 138. 
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sold 19.3% of HTIL’s interest to Orascom Telecom10, which nominated two non-executive directors onto the 
nine-member board of Hutchison Telecom. Apart from the three independent non-executive directors, HWL 
nominated two non-executive and two executive directors. In summary, HTIL no longer needed to consolidate 
with HWL
11
. 
 
 HWL disposed of a little under 50% of its shares in HTIL in December 2005 in order to improve the 
group’s performance. As discussed, if HTIL were still a subsidiary of HWL, according to HKAS 27, HWL 
would have needed to consolidate with it, thereby negatively affecting group performance in that year. 
Therefore, the group executed a strategic disposal during 2005 in order to realize significant cash proceeds and 
non-recurring profit. The sale to Orascom Telecom
12
 generated a profit of USD 951 million, which increased net 
profit in 2005 and increased cash by USD 1,298 million (equivalent to $1.42 per HTIL share) on the balance 
sheet (see Exhibits 7 and 8). By contrast, without this disposal, HTIL’s profit in 2005 would have reduced from 
USD 1,742 million to USD 781 million. 
 
 Table 1 shows that HWL decreased its holding percentage in HTIL to 49.8% in 2005 to increase 
earnings. Indeed, return on sales increased from 2.94% to 7.42% in 2005 by not consolidating with HTIL. At the 
end of 2006, HWL still held a less-than-50% stake in HTIL (no change in owning percentage); however, its 
return on sales increased to 12.31%. By contrast, if HWL had consolidated with HTIL, group performance 
would have deteriorated in 2006 (see Exhibit 9). Although return on equity for HTIL performed better than that 
for HWL, it improved little for the group (from 7.79% to 7.88%). Therefore, it was reasonable for the firm not 
to increase its holding interest in HTIL in 2006 (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 1:  2005 Ratio Analysis 
2005 HTIL HWL HTIL + HWL 
Return on Equity -0.76% 5.89% 2.74% 
Return on Sales -0.61% 7.42% 2.94% 
Assets Turnover 0.410 0.3058 32.01% 
Leverage 2.006306 1.354 1.46 
Source: extracted from Exhibit 8 (in the Appendix) 
 
 
Table 2:  2006 Ratio Analysis 
2006 HTIL HWL HTIL + HWL 
Return on Equity 9.46% 7.79% 7.88% 
Return on Sales 4.72% 12.31% 11.14% 
Assets Turnover 0.419 0.271 0.287 
Leverage 3.439642 1.331719 1.44601984 
Source: extracted from Exhibit 9 (in the Appendix) 
 
 
 Aside from financial reasons, the strategic cooperation between Orascom Telecom and HTIL aligned 
their procurement processes, meaning that they enjoyed synergies in IT and software procurement, network 
equipment, international roaming, and transmitting costs.
13
 Furthermore, this synergy effect can be revealed 
from their operating areas. Orascom Telecom and Hutchison Telecom operated in 15 countries covering 
approximately two billion people and together served over 40 million mobile subscribers. Therefore, they could 
use each other’s network systems to reduce their individual international roaming and transmitting costs. 
                                                 
10 Orascom Telecom is a leading mobile telecommunications operator in emerging markets in the Middle East, Africa and 
South Asia. It was listed Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange. For more information about 
Orascom Telecom Holding please visit: www.orascomtelecom.com. 
11 Please refer to HWL 2005 annual report p. 208. 
12 See the joint announcement document: Orascom Telecom Acquires Strategic Stake in Hutchison Telecom. 
13 Orascom Telecom has operations in Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It has a total population under license of 
nearly 460 million with an average mobile telephony penetration of 11.5%. 
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HWL Increasing Shares of HTIL in 2007 
 
 According to its 2005 annual report, HWL marginally increased its holding interest in HTIL from 
49.8% to 50.1% in 2005
14
. This small purchase of shares in HTIL meant that HWL was now required to prepare 
consolidated financial statements in order to fulfill HKAS 27. Thus, HTIL was no longer an associate but a 
subsidiary of HWL. 
 
 The main reason behind this move toward preparing consolidated statements was to improve HWL’s 
profitability. After increasing its shareholding in HTIL, HWL could reduce its loss for 2005 from a loss of USD 
4,487 million to a profit of USD 4,224 million (see Exhibit 10 in the Appendix) by disposing of its Indian 
telecommunication business. This disposal generated huge gains, which improved the return on equity and 
return on sales ratios from 9.46% and 4.72% in 2006, respectively, to 125% and 247%, respectively, in 2007  
(see Tables 2 and 3).  
 
 
Table 3:  Ratio Analysis for 2007 
2007 HTIL HWL HTIL + HWL 
Return on Equity 125.20% -11.46% 9.16% 
Return on Sales 247.45% -18.25% 15.03% 
Assets Turnover 0.3584 0.265 0.2737 
Leverage 0.4117 1.373566 1.228 
Source: Extracted from Exhibit 10 
 
 
 After consolidation with HTIL in 2007, the return on sales ratio also increased from -18.25% to 
15.03% (Table 3). On the contrary, without consolidation, HWL would have generated a negative return on 
equity of 11.46%, which would have induced discontent among shareholders. Thus, by consolidating the group 
generated a positive return on equity of 9.16%. In addition, it reduced HWL’s financial leverage from 1.37 to 
1.22, thereby improving the group’s financial position in 2007 (see Exhibit 11 in the Appendix). 
 
 Return on equity and return on sales in 2007 were 125% and 247%, respectively. These ratios were 
significantly higher than those in 2006 (9.46% and 4.72%, respectively) because disposing of the Indian 
business to a third party generated a huge profit in 2007 (Tables 2 and 3 and Exhibit 10). After consolidation, 
HWL increased its return on equity and return on sales ratios from 7.79% and 12.23% in 2006 to 9.16% and 
15.03% in 2007, respectively. This result not only turned a loss into a profit; it also increased HWL’s 
shareholding in HTIL. From the point of view of investors, however, the 2007 annual report hid the profit on the 
disposal of this discontinued operation. 
 
Spin-off of HTHK 
 
 In March 2009, HTIL distributed all share capital in HTHK. Each HTIL shareholder was allocated one 
share in HTHK for each one held in HTIL. In May 2008, HTIL agreed to spin off the Hong Kong and Macau 
telecommunication businesses listed on the SEHK. The CEO of HTHK resigned from HTIL, although other 
directors continued to operate HTIL’s divisions in other Asian countries15. After listing HTHK, investors saw 
more stable profitability and cash flow with lower risk. 
 
 HTIL spun off the Hong Kong business and listed it on the SEHK because its return rate was too low in 
2009. If the financial statements of HTHK had have been consolidated with those of HTIL, the return on sales 
for HTIL would have reduced from 39.94% to 27.53% and its return on equity would have reduced significantly 
from 48.28% to 29.6% (see Exhibit 3) as a result of the lower asset turnover of the Hong Kong business. 
                                                 
14 Please refer to HWL 2005 Annual Report P.203. 
15 Source: iStockAnalyst.com:  Hutchison Telecom: Successful Spin-Off and Listing of Hong Kong and Macau Operations 
on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
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Therefore, HWL used this method to maintain a high returns growth rate for HTIL. However, it also created its 
own investor base, provided access to new sources of capital, and incentivized management
16
.  
 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND SHARE PERFORMANCE 
 
Earnings Management 
 
 Earnings management is defined as the choice of accounting policies or other actions that affect 
earnings intentionally. This topic is an important research area as earnings management can undermine the 
credibility of financial statements which provide useful information for stakeholders in well-functioning capital 
markets. Most previous studies in the earnings management literature have focused on two types of general 
earnings management:  1) accruals management and 2) the manipulation of real economic activities. For 
discretionary accruals, firms can use provisions for credit losses, warranty costs, inventory values, and the 
timing and amounts of unusual items, whereas accruals earnings management may have the reverse effect. 
Another approach is to use real variables, although this may be costly and thus affect the firm’s long-term 
interest. According to Graham et al. (2005), most respondents use real variables to manage the earnings. 
 
 Previous studies have explored the reasons behind decisions on earnings management, including 
compensation schemes (Healy, 1985; McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Sloan, 1995), debt covenants (DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Shores, 1995), investors’ expectation meetings (Bartov, Givoly, & 
Hayn, 2002; Barton & Mercer, 2005), and better prices for IPOs (Hughes, 1986; Clarkson et al., 1992; Teoh, 
Welch, & Wong, 1998). Although earnings management can reduce blocked communication, thus reveal inside 
information (Stocken & Verrecchia, 2004).  It can also result from opportunistic earnings management (Dechow, 
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Hanna, 1999). Previous studies have also found that severe earnings management and 
a low level of earnings informativeness are characteristics of weak investor protection institutions (DeFond, 
Hung, & Trezevant, 2007; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). 
 
 However, no study has thus far investigated how a firm can manage earnings using consolidation 
techniques; namely, increasing a holding in a subsidiary in order to consolidate with it or reducing a holding in 
order not to. The present study fills the gap in the literature by analyzing an Asian firm; namely, HWL. Because 
few firms use the consolidation technique, the author applies the case study method to explore earnings 
management. However, the author cannot use statistical methods to quantitatively assess the relationship 
between this technique and share performance. 
 
 HWL used different financial techniques - including accounting for consolidation - to improve its 
profitability in different periods. As shown in the analysis above, in 2004 it listed HTIL on the SEHK and 
NYSE to improve profit levels. This, in turn, increased its return on sales, return on equity, and asset turnover 
ratios. In 2005, HWL sold almost half of its shares in HTIL in order to improve profit by avoiding 
consolidation. Once again, this measure improved the same profitability ratios. In 2007, HWL purchased a 0.3% 
share in HTIL’s interests, which turned a loss of $4.37 billion into a profit of $32 billion through consolidation 
and the disposal of investments in the Indian business. This also turned these three ratios from negative to 
positive. 
 
 In 2009, the performances of the Hong Kong and Macau telecommunication businesses deteriorated. In 
that year, they only generated USD 68 million to HTIL, which significantly and directly affected HTIL and 
indirectly affected HWL’s profitability. Once again, the group used the accounting for consolidation technique 
to spin off the Hong Kong and Macau businesses (termed HTHK), thereby improving the profitability of both 
HTIL and HWL. The group has thus continually applied accounting for consolidation to manage earnings across 
the study period. In the HTIL’s Share Performance after the Announcement of Earnings section, because this 
technique is difficult for normal investors without accounting knowledge to investigate, the author describes 
HWL’s share performance and profitability across the study period. 
 
                                                 
16 Source: Listing Document by Introduction in 2009 p.7. 
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HTIL’s Share Performance after the Announcement of Earnings 
 
 Between 2004 and 2010, HTIL sold some of their businesses worldwide in order to improve profit 
levels.  It also indirectly improved the profit of HWL in different years. For instance, in 2004 it disposed of all 
interest in Hutchison Global Communications Holdings Limited
17
 (from 79% to 52.5%) through a placement to 
generate a gain on disposal of approximately USD 0.17 billion in the 2004 income statement
18
. Through this 
earnings management technique, the firm turned a loss for 2003 into a profit for 2004. In that same year, after 
the annual report had been released, the firm’s share price rose rapidly - from $0.13 per share to $0.21 per share 
- by the end of 2005. 
 
 In 2005, HTIL purchased an owning interest in Partner Communication Company Limited (“Partner”) 
from 42.9% to 52.2%. This purchase resulted in consolidation with Partner’s financial statements, as it had 
become a subsidiary of HTIL. Because the acquisition payment to Partner was termed capital expenditure, it did 
not need to be accounted for in the income statement. However, as consolidation was required according to 
HKAS 27, Partner contributed a turnover of USD 850 million and a profit of USD 35 million to the group for 
the period from 20 April 2005 to 31 December 2005 (see Exhibit 12 in the Appendix). This increased profit 
from continuous operations from USD 192 million to 295 million. This method thus turned capital expenditure 
into recurring revenue, further increasing the share price of HTIL from $0.25 per share in March 2006 (after the 
annual report had been announced) to $0.34 per share at the end of 2006. Therefore, this share performance was 
clearly affected by the acquisition of Partner. 
 
 In 2006, HTIL used the same method to acquire another corporation and again turn capital expenditure 
into recurring revenue. During 2006, a subsidiary of HTIL in India; namely, Hutchison Essar Limited, acquired 
an owning interest in BPL Mobile Cellular Limited as well as a 100% stake in Essar Spacetel Private Limited
19
, 
while Partner acquired the transmission business of Med-1
20
 in July 2006. These three acquisitions contributed a 
total of USD 170 million in turnover to HTIL
21
. In October 2007, the company sold its entire interest in 
Hutchison Essar Limited and its subsidiaries to Vodafone, generating a gain of 9,061 million. Therefore, HTIL 
turned a loss from continuous operations of USD 405 million into a profit for the year of USD 8,712 million. In 
May 2008, HTIL spun off the Hong Kong and Macau telecommunication businesses and listed them on the 
SEHK in order to maintain a high returns growth rate of HWL. 
 
 The management of HTIL used different financial techniques (earning management) to improve HTIL 
profit in different years. These methods are difficult for investors without accounting knowledge to look 
through. It is expected that share performance after the announcement of good news increased during that year. 
Therefore, the author thus used the HTIL daily closing share price with adjusted cash/stock dividends and the 
split after announcement date of the annual report for the 2004-2010 period to calculate the average cumulative 
returns for good news (i.e., the mean current year’s profit is higher than that in the previous year) and bad news 
(i.e., the mean current year’s profit is below that in the previous year). 
 
 After the announcement of good news (Day 0), HTIL’s share price continued to rise until day 240, at 
which point the average cumulative returns was 32.8% for that period (see Exhibit 13 in the Appendix). 
Following a bad news announcement, HTIL’s share price decreased for 230 days, with an average cumulative 
                                                 
17 Before disposal, at 31 December 2003, the Group owned 37% of Vanda Systems & Communications Holdings Limited 
(“Vanda”), which was then accounted for as an associated company. In March 2004, Vanda acquired 100% of the Group’s 
fixed-line and data centre businesses, and was renamed as Hutchison Global Communications Holdings Limited (“HGCH”). 
The Group’s stake in HGCH increased to 79% of the enlarged share capital of HGCH as a result of HGCH’s acquisition of 
the fixed-line and data centre businesses. As of March 2004, HGCH was accounted for as a subsidiary company of the 
Group. 
18 Source: HTIL 2004 Annual Report P. 106 (Note 15). 
19 A company had a licence to operate areas in Madhya Pradesh, North East, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, and 
Jammu. 
20 Med-1 is a private company operating a fibre-optic network, a national communication infrastructure in Israel, and holds a 
licence to supply communication infrastructure services to Israeli companies. 
21 Source: 2006 Annual Report p.105. 
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return of -2% (see Exhibit 14 in the Appendix). This result is weaker because the sample size of bad news is 
only a two-year period during the overall study period of 2004-2010 (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  HTIL’s Cumulative returns after announcements of good news & bad news 
 
 
HWL’s Share Performance after the Announcement of Earnings 
 
 As previously mentioned, Hutchison Whampoa Limited used a different accounting technique to boast 
a profit for the years 2004-2010. For instance, HWL listed HTIL in 2004 to improve return on sales and equity. 
HWL reduced its shares holding of HTIL in 2005 to below 50% to avoid consolidation with HTIL in order not 
to jeopardize HWL’s profit in that year. HWL purchased only 0.3% shares of HTIL in 2007 to make its holding 
rise to above 50% so as to consolidate with HTIL’s financial statements and share it’s USD 9,062 million gain 
on disposal of Hutchison Essar Limited and its subsidiaries to Vodafone Group Plc. HWL shared better 
performance of HTIL in 2009 after the spin-off of Hutchison Telecommunication Hong Kong Holdings in 2009.  
 
 These financial and accounting techniques are very difficult for an investor to realize. Next, the same 
method to calculate the average cumulative share return after the announcement of good news for HWL is 
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applied in order to test whether it shows a similar result to the share performance of HTIL described in the 
HTIL’s Share Performance after the Announcement of Earnings section. After the announcement of good news 
following the release of the annual report, HWL’s share price rose from day 1 to day 188, at which points its 
average cumulative return was 21.6%. This confirms that these accounting techniques are useful to boost 
HWL’s share performance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper analyzed three Hong Kong-listed corporations; namely, HWL, HTIL, and HTHK, over the 
period 2003-2010. HWL was listed in 2004 in order to improve its performance in 2004 and 2005. Thereafter, in 
2007 HWL marginally increased its holding in HTIL in order to turn a loss into a positive profit. Furthermore, in 
2009 HTIL spun off its Hong Kong and Macau telecommunication businesses and listed them on the SEHK in 
order to improve profitability. Finally, HWL privatized HTIL at USD 0.29 per share in 2010 in order to gain a 
large amount of remaining cash from HTIL. Although HTIL was listed on the SEHK, HTIL and HWL improved 
share performance through such earnings management techniques. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Exhibit 1:  History of HWL for 1970 - 2010 
 
 
Exhibit 2:  HTIL History of Globalization 
Region Worldwide exploring event 
Hutchison India Hutchison Essar Limited started operations under the brand name "Orange" in Mumbai. 
Hutchison Orange Israel Even after selling the Orange Brand to France Telecom, they used Orange brand in Israel 
Hutchison Telecom Sri Lanka The company's Sri Lankan operation, commonly known as Hutch, is the country's youngest 
and smallest operator, but is growing fast. 
3 Indonesia In July 2005, Hutchison Telecom acquired a 60% equity stake in PT Hutchison CP 
Telecommunications. 
Vietnamobile In February 2005, Hutchison Telecom was granted an investment licence by the government 
for the project. 
Hutch Thailand In 2000, Hutchison Telecom and CAT Telecom Public Company Limited entered into a joint 
venture to provide exclusive marketing services for CAT Telecom’s CDMA mobile 
telecommunications in the Bangkok. 
Areas Year Various Businesses exploring event 
Property 1971 Hutchison Properties Limited (HPL) is incorporated to concentrate on property 
development and related services. 
Supermarkets 1973 The Group acquires PARKnSHOP supermarkets. 
Retails 1981 A S Watson becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Limited with 
75 retail food and non-food outlets. 
Telecommunication 1983 Hutchison Telephone Company Limited is granted a licence to operate an Advanced 
Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) cellular radio telephone network in Hong Kong. 
Electricity  1985 HWL acquires a substantial interest in Hongkong Electric Holdings for HKD 2,900 
million. 
Natural Resources 1987 HWL expands overseas with the acquisition of a 43 per cent interest in Canada's Husky 
Oil. 
Television Services 1990 Hutchvision Limited, a joint venture with Mr Li Ka-shing and family, is established to 
launch and operate a pan-Asian multi-channel satellite television service. 
Radio Services 1990 Metro Broadcast is awarded a license to operate Hong Kong's second commercial radio 
station. 
Railways 1993 The Group, in conjunction with Cheung Kong (Holdings) and other Chinese partners, 
signs an agreement in June to build the 'East' section of the express-way between 
Shenzhen and Shantou. 
Hotel  1995 The Harbour Plaza Hotel, with 415 rooms and 101 serviced apartments, opens for 
business. 
Financial Sevices 1995 HWL, in partnership with OTB Card Company Limited, a subsidiary of Dao Heng 
Bank Group Limited, and Visa International, launches the ComPass Card. 
Agricultural 1998 In June, Hutchison Whampoa (China) Limited has teamed up with two Mainland 
companies to develop a large scale, high-tech rice farm in Qiqihaer, Heilongjiang. 
Wines 1998 In June, Watson’s opens Hong Kong’s biggest wine cellar 
Network  On 16 December, Hutchison Whampoa and Cheung Kong (Holdings) together with 
other investors, establishes TOM.COM LIMITED. 
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Exhibit 3:  2009 HKHTH and HTIL Balance Sheets 
 
 
2009  HTIL HKHTH HTIL + HTHK HTIL HTHK HTIL + HTHK 
ASSETS        
Current assets        
Cash and cash equivalents  540.23 34.45 574.68 17.97% 1.51% 10.87% 
Restricted cash  176.35 0.00 176.35 5.87%  3.33% 
Trade and other receivables  282.65 139.46 422.11 9.40% 6.11% 7.98% 
Stocks  5.66 20.57 26.22 0.19% 0.90% 0.50% 
Derivative ﬁnancial assets  —      
Available-for-sale ﬁnancial assets  271.72  271.72 9.04%  5.14% 
  560.03  560.03 18.63%  10.59% 
Total current assets  1,276.61 194.47 1,471.08 42.47% 8.52% 27.82% 
Assets held for sale  —      
Non-current assets        
Fixed assets  1,103.98 1,212.85 2,316.84 36.72% 53.15% 43.81% 
Goodwill  209.77 578.79 788.56 6.98% 25.36% 14.91% 
Other intangible assets  128.66 43.19 171.85 4.28% 1.89% 3.25% 
Other non-current assets  287.15 170.69 457.84 9.55% 7.48% 8.66% 
Deferred tax assets  0.00 47.30 47.30 0.00% 2.07% 0.89% 
Interests in associates  0.00 0.00     
Interests in jointly-controlled entities  0.00 34.70 34.70  1.52% 0.66% 
Total non-current assets  1,729.56 2,087.53 3,817.10 57.53% 91.48% 72.18% 
Total assets  3,006.17 2,282.01 5,288.17 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
LIABILITIES        
Current liabilities        
Trade and other payables  803.60 426.35 1,229.95 26.73% 18.68% 23.26% 
Borrowings  60.41 0.00 60.41 2.01% 0.00% 1.14% 
Current income tax liabilities  — 0.00     
Derivative ﬁnancial liabilities  0.64 0.00 0.64 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 
  0.00 0.00     
Total current liabilities  864.65 0.00 864.65 28.76%  16.35% 
Non-current liabilities        
Borrowings  233.55 560.15 793.70 7.77% 24.55% 15.01% 
Deferred tax liabilities  — 0.00     
Other non-current liabilities  368.89 76.48 445.37 12.27% 3.35% 8.42% 
Total non-current liabilities  602.44 0.00 602.44 20.04%  11.39% 
Total liabilities  1,467.10 1,080.98 2,548.07 48.80% 47.37% 48.18% 
EQUITY        
Capital and reserves attributable to equity holders of the Company     
Share capital  154.76 154.76 309.51 5.15% 6.78% 5.85% 
Reserves  1,384.32 1,116.84 2,501.16 46.05% 48.94% 47.30% 
  1,539.07 0.00 1,539.07 51.20% 0.00% 29.10% 
Minority interest  — -70.57   -3.09% 0.00% 
Total equity  1,539.07 1,201.03 2,740.10 51.20% 52.63% 51.82% 
Total equity and liabilities  3,006.17 2,282.01 5,288.17 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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Exhibit 4:  Corporate Structure 
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Exhibit 5:  2004 HTIL and HWL Income Statements 
 
  HWL + HWL +  HWL + HWL + 
2004 HTIL 70% HTIL 100% HTIL HTIL 70% HTIL 100% HTIL 
       
Turnover 1,923 17,300 17,300 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Cost of goods sold -180 -6,685 -6,685 -9.36% -38.64% -38.64% 
Staff costs -205 -2,767 -2,767 -10.68% -15.99% -15.99% 
Prepaid 3G telecommunication customer acquisition   -1,083 -1,083  -6.26% -6.26% 
Depreciation and amortisation -393 -3,890 -3,890 -20.45% -22.48% -22.48% 
Other operating expenses -1,169 -4,972 -4,972 -60.82% -28.74% -28.74% 
Change in value of properties  674 674  3.90% 3.90% 
       
Profit on disposal of investments and others, net 167 2,465 1,938 8.69% 14.25% 11.20% 
       
Operating Profit 142 1,044 517 7.39% 6.04% 2.99% 
Share or profit less loss of associated companies  97 1,134 1,134 5.03% 6.55% 6.55% 
Share of profits less losses of jointly controlled entities  311 311  1.80% 1.80% 
  2,489 1,962  14.39% 11.34% 
       
Net Interest and other finance costs -135 -1,634 -1,634 -7.05% -9.44% -9.44% 
       
Profit before taxation 103 855 328 5.38% 4.94% 1.90% 
Taxation -63 391 391 -3.27% 2.26% 2.26% 
       
Profit for the year from continuing operations 41 1,246 719 2.11% 7.20% 4.16% 
       
Minority interests  827 839  4.78% 4.85% 
Profit attributable to shareholders  2,073 1,558  11.98% 9.01% 
       
Profit for the year 41 1,246 719 2.11% 7.20% 4.16% 
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Exhibit 6:  2004 HTIL and HWL Balance Sheets 
 
2004 HWL +  HWL + HWL +  HWL + 
Non-current Assets 70% HTIL HTIL 100% HTIL 70% HTIL HTIL 100% HTIL 
Fixed assets 27,113 2,600 27,113 32.24% 49.68% 32.63% 
Telecommunications licenses  13,128  13,128 15.61% 0.00% 15.80% 
Telecommunications 3G 877  877 1.04% 0.00% 1.06% 
Goodwill  1,316 789 1,316 1.57% 15.08% 1.58% 
Associated companies  7,112 237 7,112 8.46% 4.53% 8.56% 
Interests in joint ventures 4,622  4,622 5.50% 0.00% 5.56% 
Deferred tax assets 2,492 108 2,492 2.96% 2.07% 3.00% 
Other non-current assets 1,058 686 1,058 1.26% 13.11% 1.27% 
Liquid funds and other listed investments 8,548  8,548 10.17% 0.00% 10.29% 
Total non-current assets 66,266 4,421 66,266 78.80% 84.47% 79.74% 
       
Cash and cash equivalent 9,486 270 8,496 11.28% 5.16% 10.22% 
Other current assets 8,340 542 8,340 9.92% 10.37% 10.04% 
Total Current Assets 17,826 813 16,836 21.20% 15.53% 20.26% 
Total Assets 84,092 5,234 83,102 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Current liabilities 11,379 2,660 11,379 24.84% 80.05% 24.84% 
       
Non-current liabilities       
Long term liabilities 32,748 460 32,748 71.50% 13.85% 71.50% 
Deferred tax liabilities 1,529 19 1,529 3.34% 0.57% 3.34% 
Pension obligations 147  147 0.32% 0.00% 0.32% 
Total non-current liabilities 34,424 663 34,424 75.16% 19.95% 75.16% 
Total Liabilities 45,802 3,323 45,802 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
CAPITAL AND RESERVES 33,527 1,836 33,000 73.20% 55.26% 72.05% 
 
 
Part B 
   
    Return on Equity 2.13% 6.18% 4.72% 
Return on sales 2.11% 7.20% 4.16% 
Assets Turnover 0.367387 0.208 0.2057 
Leverage 1.739136 1.387939597 1.366 
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Exhibit 7:  2005 HTIL and HWL Balance Sheets 
 
2005  HTIL HWL HTIL + HWL HTIL HWL HTIL + HWL 
ASSETS        
Current assets        
Cash and cash equivalents  313 6,390 5,405 4.09% 8.33% 6.50% 
Restricted cash  0 0 0 0.00%   
Trade and other receivables  1,287 4,629 5,915 16.80% 6.03% 7.12% 
Stocks  88 2,614 2,702 1.15% 3.41% 3.25% 
Derivative ﬁnancial assets  1 0 1 0.02%   
Available-for-sale ﬁnancial assets  — 0     
  1,376 0 1,376   1.66% 
Total current assets  1,689 13,633 14,024 22.06% 17.77% 16.87% 
Assets held for sale  —      
Non-current assets        
Fixed assets  3,161 15,974 19,135 41.27% 20.82% 23.02% 
Goodwill  1,245 2,308 3,553 16.26% 3.01% 4.27% 
Other intangible assets  1,180 29,046 30,226 15.41% 37.85% 36.36% 
Other non-current assets  266 569 835 3.47% 0.74% 1.00% 
Deferred tax assets  118 2,021 2,139 1.54% 2.63% 2.57% 
Interests in associates  0.25 8,398 7,129 0.00% 10.94% 8.58% 
Interests in jointly-controlled entities — 4,792 4,792  6.24% 5.76% 
Total non-current assets  5,970 63,107 67,809 77.94% 82.23% 81.57% 
Total assets  7,660 76,740 83,131 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
LIABILITIES        
Current liabilities        
Trade and other payables  1,354 7,310 8,664 26.49% 16.81% 17.83% 
Borrowings  988 3,346 4,334 19.34% 7.69% 8.92% 
Current income tax liabilities  16 267 284 0.33% 0.61% 0.58% 
Derivative ﬁnancial liabilities  15  15 0.29% 0.00% 0.03% 
  0      
Total current liabilities  2,374 10,923 13,297 46.45% 25.12% 27.36% 
Non-current liabilities        
Borrowings  2,442 30,705 33,147 47.78% 70.60% 68.20% 
Deferred tax liabilities  124 1,767 1,891 2.42% 4.06% 3.89% 
Other non-current liabilities  171 96 268 3.35% 0.22% 0.55% 
Total non-current liabilities  2,738 32,569 35,306 53.55% 74.88% 72.64% 
Total liabilities  5,112 43,492 48,603 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
EQUITY        
Capital and reserves attributable to equity holders of the Company     
Share capital  153 137 290 2.99% 0.32% 0.67% 
Reserves  1,926 31,168 32,143 37.67% 71.66% 73.91% 
  2,078 31,305 32,433 40.66% 71.98% 74.57% 
Minority interest  469 1,295 1,417 9.18% 2.98% 3.26% 
Total equity  2,548 32,600 33,850 49.84% 74.96% 77.83% 
Total equity and liabilities  7,660 76,092 82,453 149.84% 174.96% 189.58% 
Net current assets/(liabilities)  685 -2,710 -2,025 13.40% -6.23% -4.66% 
Total assets less current liabilities 5,285 65,169 70,454 103.40% 149.84% 161.99% 
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Exhibit 8:  2005 HTIL and HWL Income Statements 
 
 
 
  
2005 HTIL HWL HTIL+HWL HTIL HWL HTIL+HWL 
       
Turnover 3,138 23,468 26,607 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Cost of goods sold -301 -8,072 -8,374 -9.59% -34.40% -31.47% 
Staff costs -299 -3,307 -3,606 -9.53% -14.09% -13.55% 
Telecommunications prepaid customer acquisition costs -1,537 -1,537 0.00% -6.55% -5.77% 
Depreciation and amortisation -563 -4,592 -5,156 -17.95% -19.57% -19.38% 
Other operating expenses -1,709 -7,742 -9,451 -54.46% -32.99% -35.52% 
Change in fair value of investment properties  474 474  2.02% 1.78% 
Profit on disposal of investments and others, net 9 3,228 2,287  13.76% 8.59% 
       
Operating Profit 266 1,920 1,235 8.47% 8.18% 4.64% 
Share of results of associated companies 11 1,037 1,058 0.35%   
Share of profits less losses of jointly controlled entities  505 505    
       
Net Interest and other finance costs -206 -1,980 -2,186 -6.57% -8.44% -8.22% 
       
Loss before taxation -80 1,482 461 -2.54% 6.31% 1.73% 
Taxation -56 261 205 -1.78% 1.11% 0.77% 
Loss on disposal of discontinued operations -43  -43 -1.38%   
Loss for the year  -19 1,742 781 -0.61% 7.42% 2.94% 
       
Loss attributable to minority interests  101 107    
Profit attributable to shareholders of the Company  1,844 889    
       
Profit for the year -19 1,742 781 -0.61% 7.42% 2.94% 
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Exhibit 9:  2006 HTIL and HWL Income Statements 
 
2006 HTIL HWL HTIL+HWL HTIL HWL HTIL+HWL 
       
Turnover 4,290 23,626 27,916 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Cost of goods sold -296 -8,626 -8,923 -6.91% -36.51% -31.96% 
Staff costs -343 -3,307 -3,650 -7.99% -14.00% -13.07% 
3 Group telecommunications expensed customer acquisition costs -706 -706  -2.99% -2.53% 
Depreciation and amortisation -652 -4,253 -4,906 -15.21% -18.00% -17.57% 
Other operating expenses -2,356 -6,537 -8,893 -54.92% -27.67% -31.86% 
Change in fair value of investment properties  365 365  1.55% 1.31% 
Impairment charge for Thailand segment       
Profit on disposal of investments and others, net 643 2,994 3,636 14.98% 12.67% 13.03% 
Associated companies before profit on disposal of investments and others     
share of profit on Jointly controlled entities  395 395  6.24% 1.42% 
share of profit on associated  1,475 1,475   5.28% 
Associated company’s profit on disposal of an investment and others      
       
Operating profit 648 1,870 2,518 15.11% 7.91% 9.02% 
Interest Income 16  16 0.36%  0.06% 
Interest and other finance costs -355 -2,134 -2,489 -8.28% -9.03% -8.92% 
       
Loss/ Profit before taxation 309 3,291 3,600 7.20% 13.93% 12.89% 
Taxation -106 383 276 -2.47% 1.62% 0.99% 
       
Loss/ Profit for the year  203 2,908 3,111 4.72% 12.31% 11.14% 
Profit on disposal of discontinued operations       
Loss/ Profit for the year        
Loss attributable to minority interests 177 -334 -157 4.12%  -0.56% 
Profit attributable to shareholders of the Company 26 2,575 2,600 0.60%  9.31% 
Profit for the year 203 2,908 3,111 4.72% 12.31% 11.14% 
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Exhibit 10:  2007 HTIL and HWL Income Statements 
 
 
2007 HTIL HWL HTIL+HWL HTIL HWL HTIL+HWL 
       
Turnover 3,521 24,593 28,114 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Cost of goods sold -351 -9,158 -9,509 -9.97% -37.24% -33.82% 
Staff costs -353 -3,416 -3,769 -10.04% -13.89% -13.41% 
3 Group telecommunications expensed customer acquisition costs 0 -737 -737 0.00% -3.00% -2.62% 
Depreciation and amortisation -567 -4,429 -4,996 -16.11% -18.01% -17.77% 
Other operating expenses -1,844 -5,412 -7,256 -52.37% -22.01% -25.81% 
Change in fair value of investment properties 0 256 256  1.04% 0.91% 
Impairment charge for Thailand segment -495 495  -14.07% 2.01% 0.00% 
Profit on disposal of investments and others, net 1 -1,438 -1,437 0.03% -5.85% -5.11% 
Associated companies before profit on disposal of investments 1,543 1,543  6.27% 5.49% 
Jointly controlled entities  429 429  1.74% 1.53% 
Associated company’s profit on disposal of an investment and others 4,604 4,604  18.72% 16.38% 
       
Operating profit -89 7,330 7,241 -2.53% 29.81% 25.76% 
       
Interest and other finance costs -41 -2,408 -2,449 -1.18% -9.79% -8.71% 
       
Loss/ Profit before taxation -130 4,923 4,792 -3.71% 20.02% 17.05% 
Taxation -71 -497 -568 -2.02% -2.02% -2.02% 
       
Loss/ Profit for the year  -201 4,426 4,224 -5.72% 18.00% 15.03% 
Profit on disposal of discontinued operations 8,913 -8,913  253.17% -36.24%  
Loss/ Profit for the year  8,712 -4,487 4,224 247.45% -18.25% 15.03% 
       
       
Profit for the year 8,712 -4,487 4,224 247.45% -18.25% 15.03% 
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Exhibit 11:  2007 HTIL and HWL Balance Sheets 
 
2007  HTIL HWL + HTIL HWL HTIL HWL + HTIL HWL 
ASSETS        
Current assets        
Cash and cash equivalents  4,706 14,307 9,601 47.91% 13.93% 10.33% 
Restricted cash  —      
Trade and other receivables  604 7,117 6,513 6.15% 6.93% 7.01% 
Stocks  66 2,699 2,633 0.67% 2.63% 2.83% 
Derivative ﬁnancial assets  3  -3 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 
Available-for-sale ﬁnancial assets  —      
  674  -674 6.86% 0.00% -0.73% 
Total current assets  5,380 24,123 18,744 54.76% 23.48% 20.18% 
Assets held for sale  —      
Non-current assets        
Fixed assets  2,179 23,309 21,130 22.18% 22.69% 22.74% 
Goodwill  780 4,051 3,271 7.94% 3.94% 3.52% 
Other intangible assets  1,005 33,511 32,506 10.23% 32.62% 34.99% 
Other non-current assets  431 653 222 4.39% 0.64% 0.24% 
Deferred tax assets  48 2,265 2,216 0.49% 2.20% 2.39% 
Interests in associates   9,710 9,710 0.00% 9.45% 10.45% 
Interests in jointly-controlled entities   5,106 5,106 0.00% 4.97% 5.50% 
Total non-current assets  4,443 78,605 74,161 45.24% 76.52% 79.82% 
Total assets  9,823 102,728 92,905 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
LIABILITIES        
Current liabilities        
Trade and other payables  1,016 11,572 10,556 35.46% 20.43% 19.63% 
Borrowings  653 6,460 5,806 22.81% 11.41% 10.80% 
Current income tax liabilities  14 300 286 0.50% 0.53% 0.53% 
Derivative ﬁnancial liabilities  15  -15 0.53% 0.00% -0.03% 
        
Total current liabilities  1,699 18,332 16,633 59.29% 32.37% 30.94% 
Non-current liabilities        
Borrowings  763 33,430 32,667 26.64% 59.03% 60.76% 
Deferred tax liabilities  75 2,308 2,233 2.62% 4.08% 4.15% 
Other non-current liabilities  328 2,558 2,231 11.45% 4.52% 4.15% 
Total non-current liabilities  1,166 38,297 37,131 40.71% 67.63% 69.06% 
Total liabilities  2,865 56,628 53,764 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
EQUITY        
Capital and reserves attributable to equity holders of the Company     
Share capital  154 137 -17 5.36% 0.24% -0.03% 
Reserves  6,438 39,711 33,272 224.75% 70.12% 61.89% 
        
Minority interest  367 6,252 5,886 12.80% 11.04% 10.95% 
Total equity  6,958 46,100 39,142 242.90% 81.41% 72.80% 
Total equity and liabilities  9,823 102,728 92,905 342.90% 181.41% 172.80% 
Net current assets/(liabilities)  3,681 5,792 2,111 128.50% 10.23% 3.93% 
Total assets less current liabilities  8,124 84,397 76,272 283.61% 149.04% 141.87% 
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Exhibit 12:  2004 - 2009 HTIL comparative Income Statements 
 
  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Continuing operations:       
Turnover 1,908 3,131 2,304 2,622 232 239 
Cost of goods sold -176 -300 -278 -343   
Staff costs -204 -298 -244 -295 -50 -44 
Depreciation and amortisation -401 -561 -489 -543 -87 -91 
Other operating expenses -1,146 -1,704 -1,116 -1,309 -392 -424 
Impairment charge for Thailand segment    -495   
Profit on disposal of investments and others, net 211 9 6 1 192 54 
       
Operating loss 192 277 182 -362 -104 -266 
Interest income 3 8 8 208 115 2 
Interest and other finance costs -134 -215 -212 -172 -94 -84 
       
Loss before taxation 62 82 -22 -326 -83 -348 
Taxation -24 -56 -84 -25 -10 -4 
       
Loss for the year from continuing operations 38 26 -106 -350 -94 -352 
       
Discontinued operations:       
Profit for the year from discontinued operations -7 -45 308 9,062 308 1,095 
       
Profit for the year 31 -19 203 8,712 214 743 
       
Attributable to:       
Equity holders of the Company:       
– continuing operations 3 -53 -153 -404 -36 -333 
– discontinued operations -7 -45 179 9,001 182 968 
       
Minority interest:       
– continuing operations 35 79 47 54 -57 -19 
– discontinued operations  0 129 61 126 127 
       
       
Dividends 0 0 0 4,143 4,332 1,315 
       
Loss per share from continuing operations       
attributable to equity holders       
of the Company       
– basic HK$0.01 (HK$0.01) (HK$0.03) (HK$0.08) (HK$0.01) (HK$0.07) 
– diluted HK$0.01 (HK$0.01) (HK$0.03) (HK$0.08) (HK$0.01) (HK$0.07) 
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Exhibit 13  
 
 
 
Exhibit 14 
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NOTES 
